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Abstract
The success of joint liability programs depends on nature and com-
position of borrowing groups. Group formation is a costly process and
in our model these costs vary with the social identity of group partners.
We show that risk heterogeneity in a borrowing group may arise due to
the social identity of the agents. The presence of caste and gender bias
may not resolve the adverse selection and moral hazard problems cre-
ated by information asymmetry between the borrowers and the lender.
We also ﬁnd that with costly group formation and state veriﬁcation,
individual liability lending may be better than joint liability lending.
Thus ignoring social identity and group formation costs can lead to
the failure of a joint liability program. Finally, the paper also suggests
that targeting diﬀerent social groups requires the use of a menu of joint
liability costs.
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11 Introduction
Small loans to groups of poor borrowers have become immensely popular in
recent years in large parts of the developing world and have begun sprout-
ing in poverty-stricken pockets of the developed world as well. Formally
called microﬁnance or microcredit, such loans usually target groups with no
access to formal lending institutions and have become the cornerstone of
many development strategies. In 19 9 9i tw a se s t i m a t e dt h a tg l o b a l l ys o m e
8-10 million households were involved in microﬁnance programs and accord-
ing to World Bank estimates, this ﬁgure would stand at 100 million poor
households by 2005 (Morduch, 1999). The most famous example of course
continues to be the much emulated Grameen Bank which lends primarily
to groups of women borrowers in Bangladesh. From a modest beginning
of $0.18 million in loans in 1979, the Grameen Bank had lent out $278.32
million by 2001. It has served as the role model in microﬁnance, spawned
innumerable clones and several hybrid institutions across the world. Banco
Sol in Bolivia and Bank Rakyat in Indonesia are some of the other major
success stories. Today such microﬁnance programs are ﬁrmly entrenched in
Africa, Asia, Latin America, Canada and roughly 300 US sites. Fledgling
microcredit institutions now exist in Eastern Europe, China, PaciﬁcI s l a n d s
and the Caribbean. Microﬁnance has had its share of failures, but it is an
integral part of the new development strategies and is now present in all
corners of the world.
This paper aims to provide answers to two simple questions: (i)H o w
do we explain the success and failure of group lending programs? (ii)C o n -
trary to what the theoretical literature claims in practice there is evidence of
joint liability programs that exhibit risk heterogeniety. Can we explain this
discrepancy between theory and practice? The paper provides simple ex-
planations for these questions by introducing costly group formation among
the borrowers of microcredit programs mediated through the social identity
of the group members.
An increasingly persuasive body of research in economics today argues
that economic agents are embedded in social structures and their behavior
is inﬂuenced by the social contexts in which they live. There is hardly any
form of economic activity, from running a hot dog stand to manufacturing
silicon chips, that does not require social collaboration. This paper examines
the role of social identity as the glue underlying the formation of groups −
the basic building block of all group lending programs, and the consequences
of group composition on the problems of asymmetric information. Identity
refers to a person’s sense of self or being and locates an individual in diﬀerent
2social categories. To name a few − gender, caste, ethnicity and religion
a r ec o m m o ne x a m p l e so fs u c hs o c i a lc o n s t r u c t st ow h i c hw eb e l o n ga n d
our sense of belonging or identiﬁcation with a particular group aﬀects our
behavior. Incorporating social identity allows us to model the interaction
between identity and the rational behavior thereby enhancing the scope of
our analysis. As Sen (1999) in his book Reason before Identity argues “ ...
identity-based theorizing can also be used in less demanding and more subtle
ways. Rather than demanding a world of separate moral islands, it can be
used merely to reject theories of justice or rationality that are judged to be
inadequately attentive to the claims of community and of aﬃliate concerns.”1
He further goes on to argue that social identity has two roles: a delineating
role which aﬀects formulations of ideas and conduct and a perceptual role
which is concerned with the way an agent perceives the world.2
Using a simple model Akerlof and Kranton (2000) illustrate these no-
tions by identifying four channels through which identity aﬀects outcomes
− people have identity based payoﬀs derived from their own actions and
from the actions of others; third parties can generate persistent changes in
these payoﬀs; and while some people can choose their own identity others are
constrained in their ability to do so. There is no dearth of examples of such
events, ranging from people willing to lay down their lives for their country,
to ethnic conﬂict in Africa and the rise of acts of terrorism motivated by re-
ligion. Examples of identity-related acts suggested by Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) include self-mutilation, alumni giving and extreme sports like moun-
taineering. Speciﬁc economic examples include gender discrimination in the
workplace, household division of labor and the economics of poverty and
social exclusion (see also Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) on the last topic).
This list of examples however is by no means exhaustive or complete. Sociol-
ogists and anthropologists have long relied on identity to understand human
behavior and economics has begun to develop formal models to further our
understanding of social identity. Our paper is a contribution to this growing
1In recent years there have been a number of papers in this vein. See for example
Mailath and Postelwaite (2002), Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Okuno-Fujiwara (2002), Kali
(2003), Folbre (1994) and Bardhan (1993). For some early work on how social elements
can inﬂuence economic decisions we refer the reader to Granovetter (1985) and Akerlof
(1976).
2Maalouf (1996) in his investigation of political violence and the surge of nationalist
feelings explores these complementary functions of identity. This Lebanese born French
writer suggests that our notions of identity is deeply ingrained. Consider the following
passage from his book: Sometimes, after I’ve given a detailed account of exactly why I
lay claim to all my aﬃliations, someone comes and pats me on the shoulder and says “Of
c o u r s e ,o fc o u r s e− but what do you really feel, deep down inside?”
3literature in economics and examines the interaction between economics and
identity in the context of microﬁnance programs.
The typical microlending program loans small amounts of money to a
g r o u po fb o r r o w e r s . T h ei n t e r e s tr a t eo nt h el o a ni su s u a l l yb e t w e e nt h e
formal and informal sector rate. The money is lent to a group of bor-
rowers (often sequentially) who chose their own members. The group is
held jointly liable for the loans. Formal lending institutions have usually
quite unsuccessful at providing these loans due to asymmetric information
about the riskiness of the borrowers and their lack of collateral. The Indian
experience in this regard has been quite well documented (see for instance
Morduch (1999) and Somanathan (2003)). On the other hand group liability
solves the typical asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard resulting in high repayment rates. The underlying rationale
is that there are eﬃciency gains from group formation that compensate for
information asymmetries since group members know each other well. More-
over, they have the ability to impose non-pecuniary punishments on fellow
group members that the lending institution is incapable of doing. Thus the
success of joint liability programs crucially depends on the structure and
composition of the group.
While it is well understood that groups have a great potential for en-
abling members to reach their goals, group formation is by no means an easy
and costless task. In a recent paper Throp, Stewart and Heyer (2003) inves-
tigate diﬀerent examples of group beneﬁts and costs and demonstrate that
the chronically poor face greater disadvantages in forming groups. Social
identity is a key variable for group formation in traditional and developing
societies. Whether we believe in the notion of a moral economy or the more
recent understandings of such institutions which demonstrate their ratio-
nal nature (see for instance Commander, (1983)), there is no disagreement
among scholars across disciplines that social categories like gender and caste
are very important. It is already quite well documented in the mutual insur-
ance literature that group formation is not exogenous. For instance Gold-
stein (2000) ﬁnds that informal insurance networks typically involve kin,
neighbors and gender groups. Fafchamps and Lund (2000) ﬁnd risk sharing
occurs within a cluster of small households. In a recent study using innova-
tive matching techniques De Weerdt (2002) ﬁnds that kinship, geographical
proximity, the number of common friends religious aﬃliation and wealth
determine the formation of risk sharing networks in rural Tanzania. More-
over, poor households are more susceptible to shocks since their networks
are not as dense as those of the rich. Goldstein et al. (2002) model endoge-
nous group formation for risk sharing using the notion of association costs.
4They conclude that gender plays a key role in mutual insurance networks in
Ghana, with women acting independently of men even within households.
Murgai et al. (2002) study water sharing arrangements in Pakistan and use
association costs to describe the formation costs of these networks. They
also conclude that kisnship and geographical proximity are key determinants
of network formation.
Interestingly however there is very little work that investigates the re-
lationship between social identity and group lending. This is despite that
fact that it is acknowledged in the literature and well documented in the
informal risk sharing studies. In their classic paper Ghatak and Guinanne
(1999) have argued that “A major obstacle to joint liability as a lending
m e c h a n i s ma r i s e sw h e ns o c i a lt i e sa m o n gb o r r o w e r sa r et o ow e a kt os u p -
port feelings of group solidarity.” Similar concerns have also been voiced by
Mondal and Tune (1993). A cursory glance at microﬁnance programs around
the world reveals that the majority of these programs, regardless of their
modus operandi, target women as their primary borrowers. The traditional
tontine in Africa has always been organized along tribal lines and tribal al-
liances are still an important social force in Africa (see also Udry (1994),
and Fafchamps and Minten (1998)). Using data from Eritrea, Lensink and
Mehrteab (2003) demonstrate the importance of social ties for repayment
rates in microﬁnance programs. Godquin (2002) however ﬁnds that social
ties have a negative impact on repayment rates, while Olomola’s (2000)
study ﬁnds that the degree of acquaintance within fellow group members
has a positive eﬀect on repayment. Wydick (1999) ﬁnds that peer pressure
is important for repayment, as well as groups where members have busi-
nesses close together have higher repayment rates. In India, not only do
these programs often target women, but the caste also plays a vital role in
these programs, especially in the context group formation and program ad-
ministration. Similarly, another widely accepted stylized fact is the notion
that microcredit programs usually do not help the “poorest of the poor”, a
group that can usually be distinguished by some social characteristics like
caste or gender. Although diﬀerent authors use diﬀerent deﬁnitions for so-
cial ties it is clear that they have a signiﬁcant aﬀect on repayment rates.
Our paper ﬁlls a gap by studying the relationship between group lending
and costly group formation based on social identity. It can be argued that
the beneﬁts of group lending stem from the fact that members can pool
information, have common norms and the ability to sanction each other as
well as the beneﬁts of risk sharing. We take the argument a step further by
positing that social identity aﬀects the formation of groups itself, which can
5aﬀect joint liability programs due to adverse selection and moral hazard.3
There are a number of reasons for considering the role of identity for
microﬁnance programs. Some as already mentioned aﬀect group formation
and group behavior, while others can have consequences for the reach of such
programs or may even aﬀect group lending program itself. A major reason
for the success of group lending programs is that members of a group can
monitor and sanction each other in non-ﬁnancial ways. Such actions how-
ever depend on the group composition and prevailing social norms. When
groups are formed endogenously, the rational agents take into account their
ability to sanction others in their group. Thus by introducing social iden-
tity into group lending we take the analysis a step backwards to understand
what types of groups will be formed. Secondly, diﬀerent social groups may
have diﬀerent action sets and also may react diﬀerently to incentives. For
instance, women in rural societies are less mobile than their male counter-
parts and therefore unlikely to “take the money and run”. Similarly Rahman
(1998) ﬁnds that women in Bangladesh are more sensitive to verbal hostility
aﬄicted by fellow members and bank oﬃcials if repayment problems occur.4
In fact this is well reﬂected in Grameen’s repayment rates − only 1.3 percent
of women were experiencing repayment diﬃculties in 1991 while the num-
ber for men was 15.3 percent (Khandekar, Khalily and Khan, 1995). Coke
(2000) argues that the typical Filipino woman is restricted in her choice of
business activity which aﬀects the utilization of the loan and its subsequent
repayment rates. For instance if the majority of women in a village open
small grocery stores, competition among them will aﬀect proﬁtability and
repayments. It is also well documented now that group lending programs
do not reach the very poor (see for instance Somanathan’s (2003) study on
India). It is entirely possible that this is realted to the social identity of the
actors especially in areas like the tribal belt studied Somanathan. A better
understanding of the role of identity will not only allow us to understand
the success and failure of microﬁnance, but will also provide guidance for
appropriate policy intervention and targeting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
3In fact a major component of a successful group lending program is the degree of
homogeneity of a group. Taub (1998) in his study of the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas
concludes: “Belonging to an artiﬁcially constructed group is not the same as belonging
to one previously embedded in a community with strong preexisting social ties, one where
social sanctions and other group pressures are likely to be eﬀective.”
4Management scientists have argued that cultural factors of the sort mentioned here
have a strong inﬂuence on group outcomes. See Gibson (1999) and the references therein
for more on this topic.
6model to analyze adverse selection, moral hazard and auditing issues. Sec-
tion 3 provides comparisons with the existing literature and has some con-
cluding remarks.
2 A Model of Group Lending
Consider a community with a microﬁnancing program where individuals can
diﬀer in their riskiness and belong to diﬀerent social groups. Each individ-
ual in the community is either a safe or a risky borrower. At the same time
individuals have a social identity like their gender or caste which is given
and aﬀects interaction among agents. Although caste is an important deter-
minant of social identity in the world today, we focus on caste primarily for
t h es a k eo fe x p o s i t i o n− the analysis carries over to any other form of social
identity with costly group formation. According to the Human Rights Watch
organization over 250 million Dalits or untouchables in the world today face
caste based discrimination in their daily life. This ﬁgure includes the so
called untouchables of South Asia (including Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Sri
Lanka and Pakistan), the “Buraku” people of Japan, the “Osu” of Nigeria’s
Igbo people and certain groups in Senegal and Mauritania. In fact, in most
rural areas the association boundaries between social groups are clearly de-
marcated and there is almost no mobility across the castes. In a study on
India, Banerjee and Somanathan (2003) have found that the measure of het-
erogeneity for India has a mean value around 0.85 compared to 0.26 in the
US cities making India much more heterogenous than the US.5 They con-
clude that caste mobility is still not pervasive in India. On a similar note
NGOs in rural south India have found that the extreme prejudice faced by
Dalit women on the three fronts of class, gender and caste makes it diﬃcult
for them to participate in micro ﬁnancing programs (Source:G F U S A ) .
The pool of borrowers in the community consists of safe high caste and
risky high caste borrowers as well as their low caste counterparts. The
model developed here follows the simple and elegant formulation of Ghatak
and Guinnane (1999). Each individual is denoted by the ordered pair ij ∈
{h,l}×{r, s}, where the ﬁrst element describes their social identity and the
second their degree of risk. Let Pij denote the probability of success of an
individual borrower who obtains microcredit. We assume that borrowers
engage in an economic activity using their loan whose success probabilities
are as follows: Pis >P ir ≥ 0,i= h,l. Also it is assumed that the safe (risky)





i where si refers to the population share of the i−th group.
7borrowers in either social category have the same success probability, i.e.,
Plj = Phj,j∈ {r,s} allowing us to drop the social identity subscript on
probabilities. Note that all borrowers are assumed to be risk neutral. Hence
keeping everything else constant a safe borrower of either social group is
always preferred by the risky borrowers. Let Y h denote the outcome if an
individual’s project succeeds while the value of a failed project is normalized
to zero.
A typical microﬁnance institution like the Grameen Bank is assumed to
be the sole lending party in this community. Denote by R the total repay-
ment amount inclusive of the principal. Following Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999) we assume that a borrowing group consists of two individuals who
are jointly liable for the loan. Since borrowers are jointly liable, we denote
by c>0 the extra cost incurred by an individual if her partner’s project does
not succeed. Further the situation is characterized by asymmetric informa-
tion: each member of the group knows the level of risk associated with their
partner but the bank is unaware of this. We assume that borrowers have
no collateral. Both these assumptions are standard in the group lending
literature and provide the rationale for initiating group lending programs.
Next we introduce the implications of social identity on group formation
in the community. We assume that it is costly to form groups, with the
c o s t so fg r o u pf o r m a t i o nb e i n gd i ﬀerent for diﬀerent partners.6 For a high
caste member we set Ch
lr = Ch
ls = λ > 0 and for a low caste member we have
Cl
hr = Cl
hs = β > 0. Typically it is easier to associate with people from
ones own caste and hence we normalize the costs of forming a group with a
partner of the same social identity to zero. Thus in our model forming groups
across social identities is costly while linking with a person form the same
social group is costless. These adjustment costs may occur due to various
reasons like violating established social norms or possible social ostracism
as a form of sanction.7 For instance, a high caste borrower may have to
face the verbal wrath of other high caste members if he chooses a low caste
partner. This can also take the form of threats or even physical and mental
torture, all of which, as argued in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) adversely
aﬀects the individual’s eﬀort and enthusiasm. Similarly, in some societies a
woman might have diﬃculties forming a group with a safe male borrower
s i n c ei tw o u l dv i o l a t et h ec o m m u n i t y ’ sc u s t o m s . T h es a m ep r o b l e m sc a n
arise in the context of forming a group across ethnic ties.
6Clearly if one person is to be liable for another’s loan, then we expect these persons
to have a fairly close relationship and creating such close ties is not costless.
7These costs are analogous to the idea of association costs in Goldstein et al. (2002)
and Murgai et al. (2002).
8These social adjustment costs can be assumed to be given exogenously.
On the other hand they can also be endogenously obtained by a simple
extension of the Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) formulation. We now brieﬂy
illustrate this extension. Let the utility of the high and low caste agents
from social interaction in the community be respectively given by
Uh = U(λ,αl)a n dUl = U(β,αh)
where αl is the proportion of low caste agents in the community and αh is
the proportion of high caste agents in the community. While Alesina and
La Ferrara (1999) label λ and β as the “degree of intolerance” we call them
adjustment costs. Let u be the reservation utility from social interaction in
t h ec o m m u n i t y .U s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tU(λ,αl) ≥ u for all participating indi-
viduals, we get λ∗ ≤ g(u,αl). Similarly, we can obtain β∗ ≤ h(u,αh). This
is quite appropriate when thinking about caste and race. The experience
of high caste agents in a primarily low caste village will be quite diﬀerent
from a high caste agent in the opposite situation. Similarly, a white person
in a predominantly black neighborhood will face adjustment costs that are
diﬀerent from those of a white person living in a predominantly white neigh-
borhood. Assuming that there are nh number of high caste and nl number
of low caste agents in the population, the number of high caste agents who
participate in the group lending program is given by
n∗
h =P r {λ∗ ≤ g(u,αl)}nh.
Similarly the number of participating low caste members is given n∗
l =







.T h i s
denotes the proportion of high caste individuals who participate in the group
lending program in equilibrium. Note, as shown in Alesina and La Ferrera
(2000), existence of at least one such equilibrium is guaranteed. Moreover
another implication of this formulation is that if nh <n l,t h e nα∗
h < α∗
l ,
suggesting that if there are fewer high caste agents than low caste agents,
then the optimal proportion of participating high caste members will also
be lower in the population. This implies that if there are fewer high caste
agents in the population, the probability of ﬁnding a high caste match is
lower for all agents leading to a higher expected adjustment cost.
2.1 Adverse Selection in Group Lending
We now explore the implications of social identity for potential adverse se-
lection due to the asymmetric information inherent in the problem. Since
9the bank does not know the borrower’s type and cannot rely on collateral,
any loan oﬀering is likely to lead to adverse selection. Ghatak and Guinanne
(1999) show that the joint liability lending can eliminate this problem. Since
each pair of borrowers is now jointly liable, safe borrowers will not team up
with risky borrowers. Thus by lending jointly the bank is able to over-
come the problem of adverse selection. Suppose borrower ij team up with
borrower i0j0. Then the expected utility of borrower ij is given by
EUij,i0j0 = PjPj0(Y h − R − C)+Pj(1 − Pj0)(Y h − R − c − C)
where C = λ∗ if i = h and i0 = l; C = β∗ if i = l and i0 = h;a n dC =0
if i = l = i0 or i = h = i0. Note that the participation constraint for group
formation is satisﬁed when EUij,i0j0 ≥ 0 for all possible ij pairings. Based
on this the expected payoﬀ of a safe high caste borrower when her partner
i sas a f el o wc a s t eb o r r o w e ri sg i v e nb y
EUhs,ls = PsPs(Y h − R − λ∗)+Ps(1 − Ps)(Y h − R − c − λ∗)
Similarly the expected payoﬀ of a safe high caste borrower when her partner
is a risky high caste borrower is given by
EUhs,hr = PsPr(Y h − R)+Ps(1 − Pr)(Y h − R − c)
As mentioned earlier no adjustment costs are incurred in this case because
of caste homogeneity, i.e., C = 0. A safe high caste borrower will prefer a
risky high caste borrower over safe low caste borrower when
EUhs,hr >E U hs,ls ⇒ λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c
Similarly we ﬁnd that a safe low caste borrower will prefer a risky low caste
borrower when
EUls,lr >E U ls,hs ⇒ β∗ > (Ps − Pr)c
Our ﬁrst proposition summarizes these ﬁndings by identifying instances
where adverse selection occurs.
Proposition 1 Joint liability lending may not alleviate the problem of ad-
verse selection in presence of positive adjustment costs across groups if ei-
ther only λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c, or only β∗ > (Ps − Pr)c, or λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c and
β∗ > (Ps − Pr)c.
10This proposition suggests that a group lending program can lead to ad-
verse selection and risk heterogeneity in group formation when there are
adjustment costs. In the presence of the adjustment costs a group lending
program can lead to gender or caste oppression through the exclusion of
a social group from a lending program. When λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c, then the
a d j u s t m e n tc o s to fh a v i n gap a r t n e rf r o mad i ﬀerent social group exceeds
the cost of having a risky partner from own social group which is given by
the right hand expression of the inequality. Hence a safe low caste borrower
m a yn o tg e ta c c e s st ol o a n so ra si sm o r el i k e l yt oh a p p e n ,as a f el o wc a s t e
borrower may not be able to ﬁnd a partner to form a group and hence gets
left out of the program.8 This has consequences for both poverty reduction
and propagation of social institutions like the caste system.
Remark: Joint liability lending can be used to prioritize and promote
social objectives. Social objectives here can range from empowering women
to caste and ethnic integration. This follows as a corollary of the above
proposition. Let λ∗ < (Ps − Pr)c and β∗ < (Ps − Pr)c, i.e., borrowing
groups are socially heterogenous. Then the lender can promote group for-
mation among women without preventing male borrowers from participating
in the program by lowering c. This will ensure that λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c and
hence women will form groups with other women. In other words by oﬀer-
ing diﬀerent joint liability penalties to the diﬀerent borrowing groups the
lending institution can inﬂuence group composition and poverty alleviation.
Consequently when borrowers diﬀer along two characteristics one of which is
observable, by oﬀering a menu of contracts using the observable character-
istic, the lending institution can inﬂuence the matching process. Similarly
let λ∗ > (Ps − Pr)c and β∗ > (Ps − Pr)c, i.e., the borrowing groups are
socially homogenous. Next suppose the lending institution wants to target
borrowers belonging to a lower caste (with cost β)o rt h ep o o r e s to ft h ep o o r
who have a hard time forming groups because they are fewer in number and
socially excluded. Then one way to achieve this is by charging diﬀerent lia-
bility costs to the two groups. By setting c1 >cthe lender can ensure that
λ∗ ≤ (Ps − Pr)c, thereby forcing the upper caste borrowers to form groups
with the lower caste borrowers. Thus joint liability lending can be used to
promote social integration. Of course this process will get an additional
boost if β∗ ≤ (Ps −Pr)c when lower caste borrowers will prefer upper caste
borrowers to their own types.
8Of course this can also arise due to matching frictions and is shown in the next
proposition.
11Till now we have considered four possible borrowers − one of each pos-
sible type.9 However it is well known in the matching literature that the
number of potential matches of each type can lead to some suboptimal out-
comes. We have also seen that the size of the two groups in the community
aﬀects the adjustment costs. Further, group size can interact with the iden-
tity parameter (adjustment costs) giving rise to “interesting” pairings. As-
sume for the moment that group lending program satisﬁes the participation
constraint of each type of borrower. To study the eﬀects of group size we
will assume that each borrower type ij can have either 2n or 2n + 1 where
n =0 ,1,2..., potential members. Consider the situation where there are
2n + 1 safe high caste borrowers and either 2n or 2n + 1 risky high caste
borrowers, and the same number of risky low caste borrowers. There are no
safe low caste borrowers in the population. This situation will always lead to
adverse selection. In fact in such a community adverse selection will occur
even if λ∗ = β∗ = 0, i.e., adverse selection will occur even in the Ghatak
and Guinnane (1999) formulation. The outcome will be similar when the
number of safe high caste borrowers is zero, but there are 2n + 1 safe low
caste borrowers.10 Next consider the two conﬁgurations shown below in the
table.
Borrower Type Number (Case A) Number (Case B)
Safe High caste 2n + 1 2n + 1
Risky High caste 2n 2n
Safe Low caste 2n + 1 2n
Risky Low caste 2n 2n + 1
Case A: In this case 2n safe high caste borrowers will form groups
within themselves. The 2n + 1-th safe high caste borrower will choose one
of the risky high caste borrowers rather than a safe low caste borrower if
λ∗ > (Ps−Pr)c. Similarly, 2n o f t h es a f el o wc a s t eb o r r o w e r sw i l lf o r mg r o u p
within themselves. The 2n+1-th safe low caste borrower will choose one of
the risky low caste borrowers if β∗ > (Ps − Pr)c. Therefore, (2n − 2) risky
high caste borrowers will form groups within themselves and (2n − 2) risky
9It is worth pointing out at this point that most of the theoretical joint liability lending
literature only considers groups of two members. Ghatak (1999) is an exception to this
issue, which we believe merits further investigation.
10There are 16 possible matching scenarios in this case and here we discuss only some
of the interesting ones.
12low caste borrowers will also form groups within themselves. The (2n−1)-th
risky high caste borrower and the (2n − 1)-th risky low caste borrower will
form a group if their participation constraint is satisﬁed. Thus we see that
adverse selection may persist even with joint liability lending because a safe
borrower opts for a risky borrower due to matching frictions arising from
community composition.
In some instances matching with a partner from a diﬀerent social group
m a ye n t a i ln e g a t i v e( λ∗,β∗ < 0) adjustment costs. For instance, a high caste
b o r r o w e rm a yb ea b l et oe x e r tp r e s s u r eo nal o wc a s t ep a r t n e ra n dh e n c e
stand to gain from such a match. Similarly a low caste borrower may derive
some beneﬁts from teaming up with a high caste partner.11 It is also possible
to think that pairing across genders might be more enjoyable than pairing
with a partner of the same gender and some agents may obtain beneﬁts from
doing so. Despite having negative adjustment costs, we still ﬁnd that the
composition of population in the community can lead to adverse selection.
Moreover, surprisingly enough, in some situations safe low caste borrowers
(safe high caste) may prefer risky high caste (risky low caste) borrowers. We
show this in the next case.
Case B: Let λ∗, β∗ < 0. In this case the 2n safe high caste borrowers
will form groups with 2n safe low caste borrowers. The 2n + 1-th safe
high caste borrower will form a group with one of the 2n + 1 risky low
caste borrowers if the participation constraint is satisﬁed. Thus even with
negative adjustment costs joint liability lending may not alleviate adverse
selection. The next proposition summarizes these ﬁndings. It states that in
joint liability lending programs asymmetric subgroup composition can lead
to adverse selection regardless of whether adjustment costs are positive or
negative.
Proposition 2 When there are 2n + 1 safe borrowers of either type the
possibility of adverse selection can arise depending upon the size of the ad-
justment costs λ∗ and β∗.
First, note that the number 2n + 1 follows from the fact that in our
model each group is a pair. With more arbitrary group sizes a similar ver-
sion of this proposition will hold. Second, while it is clear that matching
frictions can lead to adverse selection problems, here we have seen that ad-
justment costs may exacerbate these issues. Even with negative adjustment
11This might be due to the perceived upward social mobility or enabling the process of
Sanskritization as documented by Srinivas (1955).
13costs it is possible for adverse selection to arise just due to asymmetry in
the composition of the community’s population. This explanation provides
support for the claims advanced by many researchers about the somewhat
dismal performance of the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas. We now turn to
the moral hazard issue.
2.2 Moral Hazard in Group Lending
The success and failure of a microﬁnanced project chosen by the borrower
depends on borrower’s eﬀort level and other complementary inputs. The
lending institution cannot observe the borrower’s action choice. Given the
nature of asymmetric information between the lending institution and the
borrowers and the absence of collateral, the borrower does not have to choose
his actions by equating marginal costs with beneﬁts. Hence the possibility of
moral hazard, i.e., the borrower not fully accounting for the costs of project
failure cannot be ruled out. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) show that group
lending can alleviate this problem. The essence of their argument is that
safer project choices allow banks to pass on these savings in the form of
lower interest rates to the borrowers. Hence borrowers have an incentive
to increase their eﬀort level. We follow their formulation to examine the
implications of social identity on moral hazard in group lending.
Let borrower ij’ s action or eﬀort choice determine the probability of
success of her project Pij. Similarly the success of the partner’s project de-
pends on her eﬀort level Pi0j0. We assume that project success is perfectly
correlated with eﬀort. So eﬀort choice of individual ij is given by Pij ∈ [0,1].
Further eﬀort creates a disutility, and we model this disutility from eﬀort
choice as (1/2)γP2
ij where γ > 0. Thus greater eﬀort leads to greater disu-
tility. We assume that the lending institution cannot observe the borrower’s
eﬀort choice and that all borrowers are risk neutral. It is also assumed that
Y H < γ to ensure that we have an interior solution.
Proposition 3 In joint liability lending programs eﬀort choice of individual
ij increases with the partner’s eﬀort level and decreases as the number of
agents of the other social group increases in the population.
Proof: Consider a high caste borrower who chooses eﬀort level Phj.
Then her objective function can be written as
max
Phj






14The second term denotes the expected joint liability cost and the third
term shows the expected adjustment costs since α∗
l is the probability of
having a low caste partner. An alternative way to think of α∗
l is that it
denotes the proportion of low caste individuals in the population. From the
ﬁrst order conditions we obtain
P∗
ij =( Y H − R − c)/γ + cPi0j0/γ − λ∗α∗
l/γ
It is easy to check that ∂P∗
ij/Pi0j0 > 0, or the safer the partner’s project
choice, the safer the project choice of a borrower. Next observe that ∂P∗
ij/∂α∗
l <
0. We know that ∂α∗
l/∂nl > 0. This gives us ∂P∗
ij/∂nl < 0 as desired.
The proposition shows that the choice of a risky project by the partner
reduces individual ij’s probability of choosing a safe project because of the
increase in expected joint liability costs. Similarly, as the number of low
caste agents in the community increases, the proportion of low caste agents
in group lending activity increases. Consequently the high caste borrower’s
disutility cost increases. Therefore the high caste borrower now chooses a
lower eﬀort level creating a hidden moral hazard problem.
We can now examine the implications of cooperative and noncooperative
behavior in a borrowing group assuming a zero proﬁt condition for the bank.
The zero proﬁt condition for the bank is given by
RPij + cPij(1 − Pi0j0)=L
where L>0 is the amount loaned. Recall the best response function from
the previous proposition states that P∗
ij =( Y H−R−c)/γ+cPi0j0/γ−λ∗α∗
l/γ.





l − Y H)+
q
(λ∗α∗
l − Y H)2 − 4γL
2γ
Next assume that the borrowers will behave as collusive agents. We solve the
high caste borrower’s objective fuction again assuming that Pij = Pi0j0 = P.
The ﬁrst order condition now gives a diﬀerent optimal eﬀort choice which is
shown below.12
P∗ =
Y H − R − c − λ∗α∗
l
γ − 2c
12Note that these expressions are similar to the ones obtained by Ghatak and Guinanne
(1999). They only diﬀer by the social identity adjustment factorλ
∗α
∗
m.I tc a nb ec h e c k e d
that the individual liability eﬀort level is the same in both models since it does not depend
on social identity.





l − Y H)+
q
(λ∗α∗
l − Y H)2 − 4γL
2(γ − c)
Thus we see that P
c > P
nc and ﬁnd that a cooperative group will select
ah i g h e re ﬀort level. As in Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) this also implies
that repayment rates with cooperative borrowers is higher than under non-
cooperative borrowing behavior.
2.3 Costly Auditing and Group Lending
We now consider the problem of costly state veriﬁcation which arises in
any state-contingent contract. The borrower has an incentive to deliber-
ately report states of the world that reduce her loan repayment obligations.
Therefore to recover the debts the lender can audit the borrowers’ assets to
see how much wealth is available to collect in lieu of the loan repayment.
However this process of auditing is costly and when the costs are too high
no loan contracts may be feasible. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) show that
joint liability lending is eﬃcient in this regard since each borrower’s partner
now has an incentive to audit the borrower due to her liability in the event
of default. This lowers the lender’s state veriﬁcation costs. We now revisit
this problem taking social identity into account.
We will assume that borrowers can write costless side contracts with
each other and can also costlessly observe the returns of their partner. This
ensures that all group members make the same announcement about the
state of the world. We now look at the truth telling incentives for each
member:
Y H − R − λ∗α∗
l > max
n
0,(1 − ω)(Y H − λ∗α∗
l)
o
Y H − 2R − λ∗α∗
l > max
n
0,(1 − ω)(Y H − λ∗α∗
l )
o
where ω is the probability of an audit by the lender. The ﬁrst constraint
is in the nature of a participation constraint when group formation occurs
across social identities, i.e., for the sake of simplicity we assume that a high
caste borrower has a low caste partner. Clearly it is the second constraint
that will bind. It says that when a borrower gets a high return while her
partner has a low return, she has the incentive to state the truth and pay
her own debt and incur the joint liability penalty as well. Next the bank’s
zero proﬁt constraint can be written as
16P2R + P(1 − P)2R − ω(1 − P)2τ = ρ
where τ is the auditing cost and as before ρ is the opportunity cost of the
bank’s loan.
Assuming that C = R and solving the two binding constraints we get,
R = ω∗(Y H − λ∗α∗
l)/2





P(Y H − λ∗α∗




P(Y H − λ∗α∗
l ) − 2(1 − P)τ
oi
where the subscript denotes probability of an under joint liability lending
a n dt h es u p e r s c r i p ts a y st h a ts o c i a li d e n t i t yh a sb e e na c c o u n t e df o r . I ti s
easy to verify that the probability of audit under individual liability is given
by
ωIL = ρ/{PYH − (1 − P)τ}
Also from Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) the probability of an audit under
joint liability is given by
ωJL = ρ/
hn




PYH − 2(1 − P)τ
oi
From these expressions it is easy to verify that ωJL < ωIL when P<
2τ/(Y H +2 τ). However when we take the social adjustment costs into
account this changes considerably. For ωsi
JL < ωIL we need P<2(τ −
λ∗α∗
l )/(2τ +Y H −λ∗α∗
l ). Note that 2(τ −λ∗α∗
l ) < 2τ +Y H −λ∗α∗
l because
it satisﬁes the trivial condition Y H+λ∗α∗
l > 0, i.e., P is indeed a probability.
Further observe that
2τ/(Y H +2 τ) > 2(τ − λ∗α∗
l )/(2τ + Y H − λ∗α∗
l)
because it trivially satisﬁes the condition λ∗α∗
l (Y H +τ) > 0. Consequently
for some P we will get the following condition
2(τ − λ∗α∗
l )/(2τ + Y H − λ∗α∗
l ) <P<2τ/(Y H +2 τ)
Thus when we take the social adjustment costs into account, we see that
for some range of project success probabilities we get ωsi
JL > ωIL.I no t h e r
words, unlike Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) we ﬁnd that auditing is not
necessarily more eﬃcient under joint liability lending. This is summarized
in the next proposition.
17Proposition 4 Ignoring social adjustment costs in the process of costly
state veriﬁcation can lead to ineﬃcient outcomes.
This proposition argues that in the presence of group formation costs,
individual liability lending may be better than group lending. In fact the
essence of this proposition states that we cannot analyze the advantages of
joint liability lending through its impact on borrower behavior independent
of the transactions costs beneﬁts of this approach. Only such a complete
analysis will provide the conditions under which joint liability lending can
outperform individual liability lending.
3 Discussion
In recent years a number of papers have dealt with the importance and
future of microﬁnance programs and have explained the theoretical and em-
pirical signiﬁcance of joint liability lending programs. While microﬁnancing
programs have been highly successful in many countries, their success has
not been unequivocal. According to Pitt and Khandekar (1995), microﬁ-
nancing programs have been successful in poverty alleviation in Bangladesh,
Malaysia, South Korea, Malawi and Cameroon and whereas they have failed
in India, Egypt, Venezuela, Kenya and Lesotho. The jury is still out on their
impact on poverty alleviation. Similarly, repayment performance of joint li-
ability programs also exhibits variation across countries. While there are
many instances of successfully operating joint liability programs, microﬁ-
nancing is by no means devoid of failures. It has now been well documented
that microcredit programs have been less successful in areas of low popula-
tion density and weak social ties like Arkansas, parts of Africa and several
Paciﬁc Islands. The reasons cited for the failure is that low density makes
it hard to ﬁnd partners who might be far away and/or have weak social
ties. In other words a heterogeneous (in terms of social and cultural factors)
population makes it hard to form groups.
This paper explains how costly group formation aﬀects microﬁnancing
programs. For example, due to the group formation costs such programs
may not be able to reach the poorest sections of society or some safe bor-
rowers may get excluded from the program. In fact as suggested earlier it
is plausible thatdue to high social adjustment costs, the poorest households
in the tribal regions of India like Jharkhand are excluded from the microﬁ-
nancing programs (see the Somanathan (2003) study for details). Amin, Rai
and Topa (2003) have found out that in Northern Bangladesh microcredit
18programs are successful in reaching the poor, but have been less successful
in reaching the more economically vulnerable sections of the community.
We examine joint liability lending programs by modeling costly endoge-
nous group formation. The costs of group formation depend on the social
identity of the actors. Agents in the model can form groups costlessly with
those having their own social identity, while it is costly to form a group
with an agent whose identity is diﬀerent. We ﬁnd that introducing such
c o s t so fg r o u pf o r m a t i o na ﬀects all aspects of joint liability programs. We
show that adverse selection and moral hazard cannot be ruled out. Finally,
when we look at the issue of costly auditing we ﬁnd that it is possible that
individual liability lending may be better than joint liability lending once
we incorporate group formation costs.
The common notion of “assortative matching” in joint liability lending
programs is not always true when we introduce such group formation costs.
Costly group formation may force a safe borrower to tie up with a risky
borrower. In fact greater the caste/gender prejudice in the community,
higher will be the social adjustment cost and as a result higher will be the
risk heterogeneity in credit groups.
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on microﬁnance argues
in favor of risk homogeneity though there are some notable exceptions like
Sadoulet and Carpenter (2001), and Lensink and Mehrteab (2001). Sadoulet
and Carpenter (2001) model a situation where both safe and risky borrow-
ers can gain from forming a group because the joint liability contract may
allow the borrowers to set up some insurance arrangements. In such an ar-
rangement safe borrowers gain a transfer from forming a group with a risky
borrower, whereas a risky borrower can gain from matching with safe bor-
rowers and in turn make a transfer payment to compensate her. They ﬁnd
clear evidence of risk heterogeneity in Guatemala as an optimal choice in
joint liability lending, but are unable to provide empirical evidence support-
ing the transfer payments claim. Lensink and Mehrteab (2001)d o c u m e n ta
similar phenomenon in Eritrea after adjusting for matching frictions. They
claim that the insurance hypothesis may be one possible explanation, es-
pecially when returns on projects are negatively correlated. Again they do
not provide any empirical support for the insurance hypothesis. Our paper
provides a simple and alternative explanation for risk heterogeneity. By in-
troducing a cost for the formation of groups we ﬁnd that risk heterogeneity
cannot be ruled out.13 What is interesting about our explanation is that it
13Note that in 1999 the population densities of Guatemala and Eritrea were 113 and 33
persons per square kilometer respectively (Source:C I AW o r l dF a c tB o o k ) .T h e s en u m b e r s
19simple, and not contradictory to the insurance arguments made in the other
papers. In fact both can co-exist to create risk heterogeniety.
In our paper we have shown that if group formation is a costly aﬀair, the
joint liability lending programs may not alleviate moral hazard problems. In
particular we ﬁnd that while eﬀort level increases when the partner’s eﬀort
level increases because of lower joint liability costs. However, when the
number of agents of the other social group participating in the joint liability
program increases, it leads to greater adjustments costs and hence a lower
eﬀort choice. This echoes the commonly made claim that homogenous social
groups are a prerequesite for a succesful group lending program.
Our reexamination of costly auditing shows that in some cases individ-
ual liability lending may be better that joint liability lending. The cost of
auditing in our model is higher than the cost of auditing in other joint liabil-
ity lending models which do not account for group formation costs. Hence
monitoring may not be a cakewalk for lending parties even with joint liabil-
ity lending programs. Thus individual liability lending may be better when
there are zero transaction cost of lending, while joint liability lending may
be a better option because it permits economies of scale when positive trans-
action costs exist. Thus our analysis makes it clear that a holistic analysis
that incorporates both impact of joint liability lending on group behavior as
well as the transactions costs of lending is necessary to understanding the
success and failure of these programs.
Our ﬁndings also have implications for policies like targeting a particular
social group and when to use a menu of joint liability contracts. Barriers of
caste, gender and untouchability are deﬁnitely main obstacles in the process
of including “poorest of the poor” section of the society. Our paper gives
the economic intuition of failure of group lending programs in racially or
culturally divided regions. Social adjustment does not come without incur-
ring some cost. So, joint liability lending programs are not really costless
programs when caste or gender bias are deep-rooted problems in our society.
The problem may become further complicated if lending parties also biased
preferences. Our model points out that in these situations safe-risky combi-
nation may not be a second best option but the ﬁrst best. Microﬁnancing
can be sustainable even with risk heterogeneity because risk homogeneity
may not emerge at all as a result of costly group formation. We conclude
that assortative matching is not a generalized solution in case of microﬁ-
nancing − risk heterogeneity within the group takes place in many cases
where group formation itself is a costly aﬀair and social identity plays a key
in themselves could lead to high group formation costs.
20role in choosing the fellow partners.
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